Abstract. This chapter steps back from specific self-organisational architectural solutions to consider what self-organisation means in the context of complex systems. Drawing on insights in complexity and selforganisation, the chapter explores how the natural propensity of complex systems (such as the mammalian immune system) to self-organise could be exploited as a mechanism for adaptation in complex computer architectures. Drawing on experience of immune-inspired fault-tolerant swarm robotics, the chapter speculates on how complex systems such as global information systems could adopt self-organised survivability.
Introduction
In the context of computer architecture, the self-organisation concept supports goals such as self-adaptation, self-configuration, self-healing, self-optimisation and self-protection [9, 24] . These goals are ideals that would permit complex computer systems to autonomously adapt to change. Much research on selforganising computer architectures focuses on explicit solutions for specific goals. Approaches may provide well-engineered solutions to change in requirements, environment or performance. However, self-organising computer architecture solutions tend to be fragile to unexpected change, and the self-organisation mechanisms require significant extra processing and storage.
This chapter steps back from the current research on self-organising computer architectures to seek other potential inspirations. Self-organisation in relation to computer architecture is understood here to be the ability of a system to adapt to change, whether or not that change is anticipated by the designer. The computer architectures to which the chapter applies are complex computer systems with high levels of possibly-ad-hoc inter-connectivity, such as enterprise information systems, cloud or grid-based applications and service-oriented architectures. The desired self-organised property is labelled dynamic homeostasis, the ability continue to operate whilst continuously adapting to change. The chapter assumes that an approach that provides dynamic homeostasis is an effective approach to achieving many of the goals of a self-organising architecture.
Information-theoretic research (section 1.2) suggests that self-organisation should be achievable at a lower cost than that of current self-organisation mechanisms. However, the problem of engineering a system that organises itself in a desirable way is non-trivial. The chapter considers the nature of change (section 2), then presents evidence that lightweight self-organisation to address change is feasible, with illustrations from work on fault-tolerant swarm robotics (section 3). Returning to the context of computer architectures, the chapter explores how the ideas behind immune-inspired lightweight self-organisation might enhance survivability of a complex information system (section 4). The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of validation issues, a significant problem in any area of complex systems engineering.
Complexity and systems architectures
Complexity is unavoidable in large-scale computer architectures. Complexity can be exploited to make systems more robust to change. There are many definitions of a complex system. The one that is used in this chapter is based on the author's work on engineering emergent systems [28, 30, 29] .
A complex system is a system that is made up of many components (which are themselves systems). The components interact continuously, in ways that are not always those designed or intended, with each other and with the environment. At least some behaviour at the system level cannot be described or predicted directly from the behaviours of the interacting component systems.
This definition is consistent with the definitions of "system" in computer architectures and software engineering, except that it makes explicit that the component-level interactions and the high-level behaviour of a complex system may be unpredictable (the non-linearity that is fundamental to complexity in science). The traditional approach in engineered systems has been to try to contain, mitigate, or eliminate the effects of complexity. However, in natural systems, the freedom to interact allows exactly the sort of adaptation to changing circumstances that is sought for engineered systems.
Traditional engineering assumes that component interaction can be defined and controlled. In systems-theory terms, given all possible inputs, the engineer designs the functions that convert inputs into required system outputs [11, 14] . However, in a complex-systems view, the designer cannot know all the inputs to the system. For instance, it is possible that things other than those considered in the design can use the identified input channels: an example would be SQL injection via a text field in a web-form interface to an information system [16] . Also, systems can interact through channels other than those explicitly defined by the designers: some unintended interactions with an information system might be addition or changes to stored data at or below the operating-system level, or the use of resource-usage monitoring in a security attack. This means that there will be situations in which system outputs are not those intended by the designer.
Undesigned interaction is the traditional focus of security and safety engineering. However, undesigned interaction is a perhaps-inevitable consequence of computer systems with high levels of interaction or inter-connectivity (such as enterprise information systems, cloud or grid-based applications, service-oriented architectures). If we accept that these systems are complex (in the scientific sense, above), then we can turn to complexity research to seek inspiration for self-organising architectures.
Complexity and self-organisation
The term self-organisation was coined by Ashby in 1947 [7] . Ashby states that the current state of organisation is functionally dependent on the past state and some inputs; in self-organisation, the system's dynamics (rather than external inputs) are responsible for organisational state change. Ashby's definition is a reminder that a self-organising architecture is a continuum. It is also a warning that if a system moves away from its intended behaviour, self-organisation is likely to make the situation worse as it is to return the system "normal".
Shalizi [34, 35] elaborates Ashby's insight from an information-theoretic perspective, showing that a necessary condition of self-organisation is an increase in statistical complexity at the component level. (A corollary is that emergence represents a decrease in statistical complexity, at a higher level.) In order to self-organise, extra information is needed, because a component's next state is a function not just of its past state, but also of the states of components with which it interacts. This is consistent with self-organising approaches such as reflective architectures: for example, Andersson et al. [3] consider an architecture in which a system is represented in a meta-computation, and the system domain is represented in a metamodel. Self-repairability in the base system is supported by comparison with the ideal, or blueprint, held in the meta-levels. The system is able to adapt to changes in the environment, because changes in the domain, are represented in the metamodel.
Natural self-organising systems do require a lot of sophistication of extra information. One reason for the significant extra information in designed selforganisation is that, unlike natural systems, reflective systems (and other selforganising architectures in general) guide self-organisation in ways that the designers (or system maintainers) consider desirable. There is an implicit assumption that we know what a system should do, and that we want it to continue to do that. In nature there is adaptation to changing circumstances, but no predefined intent; engineered systems have a specific purpose, which determines that some adaptations are desirable, some are acceptable, but many are deprecated. Self-organisation or self-adaptation in engineered systems has an overhead in introducing the complexity necessary to adapt, but a much more significant overhead is the cost of directing adaptation.
Change in natural and engineered complex systems
Self-organising architectures seek to produce appropriate responses to change in requirements or internal malfunction. The response is to something that is identified as sub-optimal in the current situation. Taking inspiration from natural complex systems, this chapter does not distinguish among sorts of change.
To illustrate adaptation in natural complex systems, consider the immune system that maintains dynamic homeostasis in mammals. An immune system adapts through response to changes such as new pathogens (viruses etc.), changes in the host (aging processes, amputation etc.), modification of resources (change of quantity or type of food and drink). Normally, the immune system can normally adapt to gradual changes (aging, varying concentrations of particular pathogens over time, regular medical intervention), but may be significantly challenged by abrupt changes (amputation, a virulent new virus, a sudden change in diet or medical intervention). In the face of several acute changes (e.g. serious injury to a malnourished mammal with new viral infection), it is unlikely that the immune system will be able to continue to maintain the mammal.
Turning to an example of the need for adaptation in a computer architecture, consider enterprise information systems [37] . Enterprise information systems should ideally accommodate addition of new structures and applications, and the removal or replacement of old applications. The systems should be robust to server down-time and other (predictable or accidental) reliability issues. The systems should also support changes in requirements such as those due to changes in the strategy and goals of the enterprise. With high levels of integration or inter-connectivity, many changes could arise simultaneously. The ideal is to adapt to detected change, within reasonable bounds.
The detection of change is referred to as anomaly detection. An anomaly is something that is different from expectation. Expectation may refer to any characteristic: behaviour, state, input, output, patterns of interaction etc. The mismatch could be due to a "problem" with the system or a "problem" with the expectation. In self-organisation, anomalies initiate organisational state change. Anomalies are not always symptoms of unwanted system behaviours: some anomalies are indicative of the changing operational context (or requirements) of a system; others are temporary and do not merit a system response.
Internally-detectable anomalies can be variously characterised: Timmis et al. [38] identify: theoretically-impossible states (Type 0), things which are inconsistent with the recent behaviour of the system (Type 1), and longer term divergence (Type 2). These types of anomaly can be related to self-organising architectures. For example, in a reflective self-organising architectures [3] , a Type 0 anomaly would arise when the actual system diverges from the reflective model of the system: a component fails, or the model of the system is updated; the selforganising architecture should respond by realigning itself to the model. Type 1 anomalies [38] are based on the assumption that recent history is a good predictor of future system behaviour; any self-organising architecture that collects and analyses short-term time-series data (audit logs) can potentially detect when new data is unacceptably far from the current trend.
Anomaly detection provides the stimulus for self-organised responses, but response requires self-diagnosis. A problem may be survivable, either in the short term or the long term, or may require instant action. A change in the environment may be benign, may require evolution to new operational boundaries, or may be a symptom of a fault, hazard or threat to the system. An anomaly may be symptomatic of one or many problems, whilst a problem may cause one or many anomalies (at a time or over time). Diagnosis and selection of appropriate responses is harder than detection.
Approaches to diagnosis and response often turn to nature for inspiration. However, whilst natural systems can provide useful insights and inspire engineered mechanisms, the natural inspiration is often somewhat vague. For example, self- * research often implies that self-awareness is a characteristic of robust natural systems 1 . In reality, natural complex systems are robust not because they are self-aware, but because they evolve to changing environmental conditions by subtle ongoing change. Survivors tend to have evolved to be robust to removal or restriction of some components. They may also survive significant alteration of their operational environment, so long as it is slow enough to allow adaptation and does not take the natural system outside its operational envelope.
Finally, natural systems use degeneracy rather than redundancy to cope with unexpected failure. A degenerate system such as the immune system, has structurally-different components that produce similar outputs under normal conditions (like redundant components). However, in abnormal situations, components may adopt new behaviours and produce different outputs [39, 15, 5] . A degenerate system is adaptable to unpredictable changes in circumstances and output requirements. Tononi et al. provide a convincing information-theoretic analysis of advantages of degeneracy over redundancy, and state, "It is no accident that selectional processes such as those that underlie evolution and the immune system show widespread evidence of degeneracy." [39] . In immune systems, degeneracy has been shown to be a more powerful mechanism for fault tolerance than the traditional engineering solution of redundancy [26, 12, 15] .
The following section explores immune-inspiration further, considering selforganising robot organisms. The section describes features of artificial immune systems used for identifying and responding to various forms of change. In the subsequent section, immune inspiration is speculatively applied to a hypothetical complex information system.
Adapting to change: using immune inspiration
The motivation for turning to immune systems for inspiration is the observation that mammals are complex systems in dynamic homeostasis, which is maintained by the interaction of neural, endocrine and immune systems. Roboticists and others use immune analogies in the design of many self-organising behaviours (e.g. learning [42] and foraging [40] ). Of particular relevance here is work on fault tolerance and problem solving: the focus of, for example, the SYMBRION project (www.symbrion.eu). In this context, Owens et al. [26] review key immunological theories, and justify the immune inspiration with reference to Cohen's thesis [12] that the immune system behaves as if it has an intended purpose, namely the maintenance of the organism in a viable state. (Whether the "purpose" is there by accident or design depends on your theological standpoint.)
The immune system operates on many temporal and spatial scales. The innate immune system provides a programmed response to known pathogens on an evolutionary time scale. The somatic, or adaptive, immune systems respond to new, unforeseen problems. The systems interact at many levels, to maximise the effectiveness of detection. In addition, the immune system has layered mechanisms and defences that can destroy, contain or repair, depending on circumstances. These features are exploited in immune inspired robotics, and might be used more generally in self-organising architectures.
In the SYMBRION project, Kernbach et al. [21] describe the conceptual architecture of an adaptable, self-organising robot swarm that can form and maintain a higher robotic organism. The individual robots each have an artificial immune system (AIS) that can determine when its operation is moving outside normal limits. In the higher robot organism, the immunological (performance) information is shared across an "immune network" that emerges naturally through the interactions of robots [21] . Kernbach et al. [21] describe how the collection of robots moves from acting as a loose swarm, to a self-organised adaptive organism that can evolve solutions to problems of the environment (ranging from navigational issues and overcoming obstacles to dealing with malfunctions in some of the robots). To support adaptivity, Kernbach et al. [21] reward information acquisition from the environment. The information is used in maintenance of the robot organism, as the AIS of individual robots make adjustments to maintain the state of the higher organism (to maintain dynamic homeostasis).
Comparing swarm robots and complex computer architectures
A complex system (section 1) is made up of interacting components that are themselves systems. In swarm robotics, the components are individual robots. In a complex computer architecture, the components are the servers, processors, applications etc. that make up the system.
From systems theory, any system can be represented as a set of inputs, a set of outputs, and mappings from inputs and outputs (which may use resources internal to the system). A robot takes inputs by monitoring its environment, and the outputs are movement and other external behaviours. Similarly an architectural component can be represented as its input and output data and events. In both situations, the designed and unintended interactions among components represent a flexible network. If the computer architecture is truly complex then, like the swarm robots, we can envisage the connected system as a dynamic network that requires the same sort of adaptive responses as robot organism maintenance. As in the robotic analogy, the complex computer architecture should be able adapt, to repair or replace components, and to respond to new components, new challenges or changed requirements.
In the case of complex computer architectures, the novel problem is formulating appropriate solutions: in the robotic organism [21] , the robots determine what they need to do by analysing their environment, which essentially means recognising different sorts of obstacles or different sorts of malfunction in themselves or other robots; in computer architectures, a wider range of challenges is anticipated. However, the multi-level approach development and maintenance of dynamic homeostasis described by Kernbach et al [21] is flexible enough to cope with a wider range of problems. Before pursuing the analogies further, a specific self-organising adaptive aspect of the swarm robots is considered in more detail: anomaly detection and fault tolerance.
Immune-inspired fault tolerance in swarm robots
Timmis et al. [38] detail an immune-inspired approach to fault tolerance 2 for the SYMBRION robots and robot organism described by Kernbach et al [21] , in which each robot AIS provides potentially useful information concerning the state of the system.
The robot fault tolerance mechanisms are inspired by the role of lymphnodes in the innate and adaptive mammalian immune system [38, 5, 26] . In simple terms, lymphnodes are organs that host the immune response, which is based on the current state of the immune system and signals generated by cells. The lymphnodes act on immune system cells, white blood cells collectively referred to as lymphocytes. The innate immune system is the inherent protection against pathogens: potentially damaging invaders. Innate immunity also has important roles in detection and in initiation of more sophisticated immune responses. The immune cells involved in innate immunity bind to the characteristic molecular patterns of micro-organisms and present them to the T cells that are the key to most immune responses. Innate immunity is based on a simple model of the "normal" organism; change to what is "normal" can occur, but only on an evolutionary time scale. The adaptive immune system comprises interacting systems that drive acquired immunity, adapting to the changing circumstances. The combined behaviour of the innate and adaptive immune systems is to detect and respond to antigens. Antigens are toxins or enzymes emitted by microorganisms; some are responses to pathogens and represent danger, but others are emitted in normal situations and must be ignored. The circumstances of both normal and dangerous situations change over the life of the host mammal. A simple summary of how adaptive response is achieved starts when lymphocytes are activated by antigen binding and proliferate (called clonal selection); clones produce antibodies that are specific to the identified antigen. Some clones become memory cells -thus memory is enforced by subsequent exposure to the same antigen. Other clones produce large amounts of antigen to attract the cells that destroy the antigen source.
In the SYMBRION robots, anomalies represent pathogens or antigens; anomaly detection takes place both in component systems (robots) and in the whole robot organism [38] . The different capabilities of the immune-inspired system tackle the different types of anomaly (summarised in section 2, above). Type 0 anomalies are detectable by the innate immune system, which holds the model of "normal" -this is not a full definition of the operational state of the system, but a simple representation of the operational boundaries of the components. Detection of a type 0 anomaly occurs when a parameter value is outside the defined normal operational boundaries, and the diagnosis is simply a record of which parameters are out-of-range. Detection of type 1 and type 2 anomalies uses the combined innate and adaptive immune systems, and is analogous to identifying a new antigen. The processes rely on continuous analysis of logged performance and audit data, with comparison both against what is expected, and against what has been seen in the past.
The artificial innate response is not just a response to single parameter variation, but a means of correlating the various input sources over a time window, to identify the likely source(s) of detected anomalies; the analysis can indicate the severity of the anomalous situation (should the component be shut down, or can it just be ignored, for instance). Furthermore, because the artificial innate immune system uses time-window data, it can evolve slowly as the normal operating conditions change. A classic dendritic cell algorithm [17] can be used, whilst Mokhtar et al. [25] present a minimal version of the algorithm for fault tolerance in limited resource situations. Timmis et al. [38] illustrate the approach using the weighted sum of signals from three sensors, with graded thresholds relating to the certainty that an anomaly has, in fact, occurred. The algorithms detect type 1 anomalies and diagnose the robot sensor(s) responsible for the anomaly.
An important aspect of the AIS described by Timmis et al. [38] and Mokhtar et al. [25] , is the lymphocyte's self-detector : an array of values that express the state of a robot as it is performing a particular task. An instance of the selfdetector includes the resource-characteristics of the task, the state of each of the components during this task, and a number of measured actuation outputs for the runnings of the task (describing the values -exact or fuzzy -of various system parameters). Finally, each self-detector includes a two-part health measure that records the apparent health of the whole system and a measure of whether the self-detector is a candidate for (probabilistic) removal from the self-detector set [38] . Evolution is supported by introduction of new self-detector instances that are slight variations on existing instances (allowing new anomalies to be detected), and a process of removing instances that are no longer useful. The approach uses gene libraries [10] , which constrain generated instances to realistic profiles. The algorithm detects type 1 anomalies, and provides a potential contribution to detection of type 2 anomalies [38, 25] . The T-cell inspired part of the artificial immune system uses a system of generalised receptors that has been shown to reliably detect type 1 and type 2 anomalies [38, 27] .
Like many other anomaly detection approaches, the AIS described here are essentially ways of learning or encoding the probability that an observation lies within a particular region of the input space. Timmis et al [38] show, for instance, that the T-cell approach is akin to other density estimation techniques, whilst the clonal selection approach is akin to a k-nearest-neighbour approach.
For organism-level anomaly detection, Timmis et al. [38] describe two approaches to sharing of immunological information. The first requires robots to pass generated immune information (danger signal values, clones, receptors) to other robots. The second (which has been used in practice for error diagnosis in ATMs [13] ), maintains a central set of network detectors derived from the immune information of individual components. The cells, instances, signals etc are subject to the same evolutionary processes and maintenance criteria to ensure relevance and freshness.
This brief review of the immune-inspired fault detection shows that adaptive anomaly detection and diagnosis is possible. Because the approaches are designed for simple robots, the mechanisms are compact and efficient: Mokhtar et al. [25] note that the modified dendritic cell algorithm fits comfortably within the 256KB flash memory of a robot micro-controller.
Tolerance and survivability vs correction
The work on swarms and robot organisms is concerned with adaptability and fault tolerance -the ability to respond to new challenges, and to maintain dynamic homeostasis in the organism despite the presence of malfunctioning individuals. Timmis et al. [38] explicitly aim at fault tolerance rather than correction: that is, the robot organism can continue to achieve system-level behaviours when some of the individual robots have failed and others have non-fatal faults. In many situations, fault tolerance is an acceptable solution. Systems continue to operate, with some degradation of service.
Fault tolerance is also recommended in work on critical software architectures. Knight and Strunk [22] recommend survivability, in which systems can continue to provide some functionality in the presence of faults, generating diagnostic information. A system may be operating below its full potential but maintain critical functionality. Knight and Strunk [22] are interested in what it means to specify (and to meet a specification of) survivability. This refocuses design attention on to what is needed to maintain the most critical functionality of systems. This uses a simple form of degeneracy, in which existing architectural components can adopt a survival mode in appropriate contexts.
The notion of criticality depends on the context or environmental situation, and varies over time. Knight and Strunk [22] give the example of a failure of the automatic landing subsystem of an aircraft control system. Whilst this is a critical function, its loss is survivable, but the pilots need to be alerted. If the plane is not engaged in landing, a simple notification is sufficient. However, when the automatic landing system is controlling the landing process, survivability would require a graceful degrade process that safely transfers control back to the pilots. The contextual aspect of survivability fits with the features of the immune-inspired anomaly detection and tolerance -for instance, the continuous monitoring of operational boundaries can be used to determine the state and context of the system when a fault leads to loss of functionality. Furthermore, the mechanisms such as the AIS self-detectors relate health to task, allowing the identification of tasks that are still viable in reduced operating situations.
Focusing on survivability is appropriate when external intervention is possible. The challenge of co-ordinating self-organising maintenance mechanisms and human interventions applies in many contexts. For example, the PerAda work on pervasive adaptation [19] considers both human intervention in a system, and human intervention to extend and change the repertoire of responses.
The following section brings together some of the ideas of immune-inspired fault tolerance and survivable software architectures. The example is from Knight and Strunk [22] : a complex financial payment system that displays some limited, programmed ability to adapt to anomalies such as component failure and security attacks. The discussion proposes ways in which the immune ideas could enhance adaptability to cope with multiple failures as well as evolution of what is "normal" through maintenance of dynamic homeostasis.
A hypothetical example: financial information
One of the system examples used by Knight and Strunk [22] to illustrate survivability is a critical information system supporting a financial payment system. Their analysis predates much of the rise in Internet banking, and the so-called banking crisis of 2009.
Banking and financial payment systems, whilst complex and critical, are accessible and highly regulated. There is potential for human intervention in fault correction, but systems must continue to operate whilst intervention is prepared. Survivability therefore requires timely identification of critical errors with appropriate notification to human operators, and maintenance of appropriate services whilst or until human intervention takes place.
The business-criticality of financial information systems means that the human and financial resource required to engineer high-quality systems should be available. The system described by Knight and Strunk [22] is highly distributed; the presence of humans in the system and the need to survive partial failure increases the system complexity. The components of financial information systems typically support large-scale data storage and high-volume transaction processing, so computing resource is not an issue (in contrast to the robot organism). Furthermore, there is a design-acceptance in financial information systems of the need to use system resource for system maintenance and security.
The financial information system [22] supports a typical banking hierarchy, from branches up to central banks, with financial services from domestic banking through retail and commercial banking to management of the international money supply. Hazards relate to local or regional failures (systems, communi-cations, power); security threats include compromised services and co-ordinated attacks. Changes in requirements are not considered [22] . The authors identify five example levels of tolerable service: primary, industry/government, financial markets, foreign transfers, and government bonds [22] . The primary, or preferred, level of service is the normal expectation. The different services of the banking organisation have different temporal and volume characteristics. For example, domestic markets are closed at night; stock, bond and commodity market services must continue to function under exceptional and unexpectedly high volumes of trading. Some contextual issues are noted: for example, exceptional levels of trading in government bonds is associated with political crises [22] .
Knight and Strunk [22] show how monitoring functions and context can be used to direct the parts of the financial payment system that should be supported when a failure, such as complete loss of a server, occurs at different times of day and in different political and trading contexts. Their analysis also shows how a sequence of failures -their example is a major server failure followed by a co-ordinated security attack -changes the survivability option. The pattern of survivability is determined by a response to a single anomaly, or a sequence of anomalies, but not to concurrent anomalies, and the response is the same regardless of the type or severity of fault. To support survivability, the monitoring functions analyse time series data: the illustration requires two bytes of extra information, comprising three 1-bit state variables, five 2-bit state variables and six priority levels [22] . Some simple self-organisation capability is supported, allowing the system to continue operating whilst anomalies are investigated.
It would not be unreasonable to expect that the banking sector could afford more than two bytes of information, and a few basic operations, to support selforganising maintenance of its information systems. With further information on the nature of the anomaly and its effects, a more sophisticated survivability response could support better targeted adaptation to concurrent anomalies and to changing operating contexts (requirements).
Potential enhancement of survivability with immune fault tolerance
Natural complex systems are simply evolutionary survivors, whereas engineered systems are produced for a purpose. There are few systematic approaches to nature-inspired systems development. Stepney et al. [36] propose a principled approach which has been used experimentally to derive immune algorithms [6] .
Stepney et al. [36] also identify five meta-probes, or general criteria, under which natural systems can be analysed: openness, diversity, interaction, structure, and scale. Azmi et al. [8] use the meta-probes to analyse and compare the characteristics of an application (adaptive information filtering) and aspects of the mammalian immune system, in order to extract natural idioms for adaptation. This systematic approach could be used to design self-organising mechanisms by matching self- * requirements to the characteristics of the natural systems from which inspiration is sought. For now, however, a more general overview of how immune mechanisms might enhance survivability is presented. How might the survivability of such a system be enhanced by immune-inspired self-organising dynamic homeostasis? What is needed to provide immune-inspired self-organising dynamic homeostasis?
The immune-inspired approach outlined in section 3 would require that any component system of the architecture has its own immune-inspired anomaly detection, and that information can be shared with other component systems.
The innate and adaptive immune functions require that the normal operating boundaries of the individual system, and of the whole financial payment system, are analysed and defined. Whereas in the robot systems these boundaries related to sensor information, motor output etc., in the case of an information system, the operational boundaries relate to normal usage and normal performance criteria. In a critical information system, the performance criteria should be determined in the design process, and much of the required monitoring information would be routinely logged for audit trails. However, determining the most effective information to store and the most useful way to represent it is a task that requires careful analysis and design. The analysis task is closely related to existing safety and security analysis.
Turning to the complete financial payment system, the connectivity of the integrated systems is akin to the ad hoc dynamic communication network of an immune system, and of the robot organism [38] . The component systems can communicate information about operational state alongside the regular system interactions, enabling the same emergent immune network support for systemwide error detection and fault tolerance. As an illustration, considering the case of a major server failure during a normal working day. The component AIS might be able to anticipate the failure through the three-pronged anomaly detection of the innate and adaptive systems. Even if the failure of the server was inevitable, interacting components would have been alerted, allowing time to degrade services and inform to users, and to pass diagnostic information to engineers. As in the robot organism, the expectation is that the response would be an evolved survivability strategy of the system, so that it could make best use of resources: a failing server might, for instance, be automatically backed-up and might delegate critical operation to servers elsewhere in the network.
A significant challenge in many AIS designs is to determine the most efficient data and data representation. However, the approach inspired by the innate and adaptive immune systems has been shown to be robust to sub-optimal data representation. Kernbach et al. [21] recommend collecting a wide range of monitoring data; this allows the AIS to self-organise to new operating situations, exploiting the data that are most effective at any point.
Knight and Strunk [22] do not explore survivability in the context of requirements change. The recent history of the banking sector gives some pointers to the scale of changes to which such a critical information system might be expected to adapt. For instance, consider what happens to Knight and Strunk's survivability strategies [22] in truly-global financial markets. In a global financial market, simple maintenance of foreign transfer services in the financial payment system [22] is too crude a strategy: anomalies might affect some transfers but not all. Better information coverage, coupled with the ability to track the source of faults from collections of detected anomalies using self adaptation (as demonstrated in [25] ), might allow the AIS mechanisms to identify whether an anomaly affected all foreign transfers, and to determine a targeted survivability strategy. For example, if only Hong Kong trading is affected, all other foreign trading could continue normally (if that was financially appropriate) whilst the fault was attended to; furthermore, the AIS might be able to use the emergent immune network to evolve re-routing strategies that would allow Hong Kong transfers to continue by an indirect route. The issue of maintaining communications across fragile networks is, of course, an essential feature of global Internet provision; the example is used here to demonstrate that holding information about which operational boundaries are breached allows a targeted survival strategy.
A radical change such as the introduction of Internet banking would be a significant challenge to the conventional survivability approaches. Indeed, the way domestic banking is conducted breaks one of the fundamental assumptions of [22] : that domestic markets are shut at night. New survivability analyses would have been required, of existing as well as new services. Potential failure scenarios would have to be developed, and appropriate responses identified.
However, the introduction of all-night domestic payment activity would be typical of the long-term change that can be accommodated by a self-organising AIS. Whilst the first few domestic transactions at midnight would be detected as type 0 anomalies (behaviour outside the normal operational boundaries), the continued night-time activity of the domestic payment market would gradually appear as a type 2 anomaly, and when it became apparent that this was the new norm, the innate immune system would evolve to recognise the operational boundaries of 24-hour banking as the normal pattern of behaviour.
The radical change problem is akin to the problem of initialising an immune system component on a complex critical system: there is a bootstrap period, which may have to be off-line or based on simulated observations, before the immune system can be allowed to interfere directly with the running of the host system. One immune analogy is the mammalian foetus's developing immune system before exposure to the outside world, or the clean-room isolation of a patient whose immune system has been compromised by drug therapies, to allow their own immune system to re-establish itself. An example of AIS bootstrapping is provided by the immune-inspired detection system for ATMs [13] : an off-line process creates an initial population of detectors, which are then continuously updated by the on-line system. Another immune analogy would be immunosuppressant drug treatments for transplant patients. In the model described by Timmis et al. [38] and Mokhtar et al. [25] , safe antigen signals or self detectors corresponding to the new service tasks could be inserted in to the existing repertoire of the AIS, to ensure that the new system tasks were not mistaken for, for example, personation or middleman attacks.
The web services and security services required for trustworthy Internet banking is a significant development exercise. If immune-inspired self-organising dynamic homeostasis mechanisms had already been part of the existing financial systems, then the additional work is in analysing and implementing componentlevel immune protection to the new system components, extending (but not radically changing) the security analyses that are required for new Internet banking systems. At the whole-system level, the operational boundaries of the enhanced financial payment system would also have to be reviewed, with possible changes or additions. In both these cases, most new information requirements are likely to have existing solutions, but some new operational boundaries and representational problems may need addressing.
Since the new financial services have interactions with the existing services, they would naturally support immune interaction, but the immune algorithms need to be robust to the addition of new services. In principle, this is no different to the situation where a service has been unavailable for a period and is then re-started. An extension phase with some human intervention in the immune system would facilitate the smooth transition to new banking modes.
Validation and assurance
in work on self-organising architectures, validation is crucial. Whilst there has been a reluctance to include non-deterministic or heuristic solutions, there is accumulating evidence that such solutions can be incorporated in critical systems. For example, Kurd et al. have investigated the use of neural networks in critical systems [23] .
The underlying system which would be subject to immune-inspired selforganisation mechanisms is, of course, subject to conventional validation. In the financial payment example explored in section 4, the inputs to the immuneinspired fault detection system are part of the underlying system, or simple derivations from these: the operational boundaries are taken form the system specification and design, whilst the monitoring data comes from system variables and audit-trail logging. Much of the analysis exploits conventional critical systems analysis needed for dependability and safety or security assurance. It should be stressed that high-quality engineering, of the functional and nonfunctional parts of the composite systems, is a prerequisite of the validation of such a system augmented by immune-inspired fault tolerance and survivability.
In considering how to validate immune-inspired dynamic homeostasis, one way to explore the dynamic behaviour of a complex system is simulation. Alexander and others show that agent-based simulation can be used in analysis of a complex system, in the context of safety [2, 1] . A common feature of the work on critical system validation and bio-inspired or heuristic techniques is its reliance on arguments of assurance. Polack et al. [29] propose argumentation for validation of agent-based simulations, complementing traditional engineering of simulations (see, for instance, the work of Sargent [33, 32] ). If a simulation can be argued to be a valid model of a dynamic system, then it can be used to provide evidence of the presumed behaviour of that system in different contexts.
Mokhtar et al. [25] summarise results of simulating the effect of running a modified dendritic cell algorithm on the self-organising robot organism, and of running the algorithm on the real robots. They have the advantage of working with a simulator that is explicitly designed for the robots that they use. However, the principle of simulating the effects of self-organising fault tolerant or survival behaviours can be explored for other system architectures.
How could simulation be used in the validation of immune-inspired dynamic homeostasis? Essentially, we have two complex systems to consider: the host architecture, and the AIS. In simulations of immune systems (natural or algorithmic), it is common to simplify the model of the host system so that only those parts that interact directly with the immune system are included (see, for example [31, 18] ). In engineering terms, the abstract model of the host system is the test harness for the immune algorithms. In the case of a engineered system such as the hypothetical financial payment system in section 4, conventional design approaches start from abstract models of the system, and simple representations of component interaction should be sufficient to create a simulation of how the systems interact. Simulation can be derived from the abstract design models of the system, using operational and log data, to express transaction volumes and variation etc. On this simple-as-possible simulation of the host system, the immune-inspired system can be run directly, in the same way that code modules are tested on a test harness. The design of tests for the AIS running on the abstract simulation of the host system should follow guidelines for conventional testing. For instance, testing should seek to establish sufficient coverage of the domain (the possible anomalies, faults, and survivability scenarios). Cases of expected and unexpected evolution should also be explored as far as possible.
Conclusion
This chapter has developed a case for treating the problem of self-organising computer architecture from the perspective of a complex system maintained in dynamic homeostasis. Self-organisation requires additional information and freedom to adapt to unforeseen situations (anomalies).
The viability of such a solution is demonstrated by the existing work on fault tolerance in robot swarm organisms, which provides a lightweight implementation of a sophisticated immune-inspired fault tolerance system. The robot fault tolerance is inherently similar to the survivability approach taken in some critical systems work.
The robot organism's immune-inspired dynamic homeostasis approach uses an interacting set of algorithms based on innate and adaptive immunity. Selforganising computer architectures of the complexity considered here would have the resources to support AIS mechanisms, offering the potential to extend and develop evolvable survivability into critical information systems. Immune-inspired solutions have the additional advantage that much of the required basis exists in systems design and conventional audit-trail data from system logs. The analysis required to design survivability is similar to conventional security analysis, using design information about the intended operational boundaries of the system and its components.
Whilst validation of non-deterministic approaches such as AIS is often seen as problematic, the conventional validation of the host system could be augmented by simulation of the immune-inspired survivability mechanisms, as demonstrated in critical systems assurance.
The AIS mechanisms, and indeed the focus on survivability rather than repair, lack the predictability of self-organising approaches such as reflectivity. However, the relatively lightweight nature of AIS fault tolerance, and the robustness to new operating circumstances, along with the scope for better targeting of survival strategies, makes the approach considered here potentially attractive for constantly-developing large scale complex systems such as enterprise information systems, cloud or grid-based applications and service-oriented architectures
